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Enhancing the connections between patterns in permutations
and forbidden configurations in restricted elections
Luca Ferrari
∗
Abstract
We investigate the connections between patterns in permutations and forbidden configu-
rations in restricted elections, first discovered by Lackner and Lackner, in order to enhance
the approach initiated by the two mentioned authors. More specifically, our achievements
are essentially two. First, we define a new type of domain restriction, called enriched group-
separable. Enriched group-separable elections are a subset of group-separable elections, which
describe a special, still natural, situation that can arise in the context of group-separability.
The exact enumeration of group-separable elections has been very recently determined by
Karpov. Here we give a recursive characterization for enriched group-separable elections,
from which we are able to find a recurrence relation and a closed formula expressing their
number. Our second achievement is a generalization of a result of Lackner and Lackner,
concerning the connection between permutation patterns and forbidden configurations with
3 voters. Our result relates forbidden configurations with the strong order on pairs of per-
mutations, a notion which is still largely undeveloped, and suggests a potential approach for
the determination of upper bounds for restricted elections whose forbidden configurations
contains at least one configuration with 3 voters.
1 Introduction
An election is a pair (C,P ) where C is a finite set and P is a tuple of total orders on C.
The set C is the set of candidates and the tuple P is the tuple of preferences. If we are not
interested in the specific order in which the preferences are listed, we speak of the multiset of
the preferences, where the term “multiset” refers to the fact the each preference can appear
more than once. When |C| = m and |P | = n, we say that (C,P ) is a (m,n)-election. In this
case, the set of candidates is usually the set [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m} and the tuple of preferences
is denoted P = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn). The set of electors, or voters is the set [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, i.e.
the set of indices of the preferences. Each preference Vi represents the ranking of the candidates
proposed by voter i, and will be sometimes identified with the voter itself. When voter i prefers
candidate x to candidate y, we write x >Vi y. We explicitly notice that, throughout the whole
paper, rankings are assumed to be total orders, and in particular they do not contain ties.
In social choice theory it is rather customary to apply some domain restriction to elections.
This is mainly motivated by the attempt to find reasonably interesting elections that escape
certain classical paradoxes (such as Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem or Condorcet paradox). Well
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known and studied domain restrictions are the single-peaked restriction [Bl] and the group-
separable restriction [I].
It turns out that several domain restrictions can be described in terms of forbidden configura-
tions. Consider a (m,n)-election (C,P ) and a (h, l)-election (S, T ), with T = (T1, T2, . . . , Tl). We
say that (C,P ) contains the configuration (S, T ) when there exist injective functions f : [l]→ [n]
and g : S → C such that for every x, y ∈ S and for every i ≤ l, if x >Ti y then g(x) >Vf(i) g(y).
Otherwise, we say that (C,P ) avoids (S, T ).
In recent years there have been quite a few publications dealing with domain restrictions and
forbidden configurations. Both single-peaked and group-separable domains can be characterized
in terms of forbidden configurations [BH]. In [BCW] a similar characterization has been provided
for single-crossing domains, whereas one-dimensional Euclidean domains are studied in [CG,
CPW]. Also, some investigation concerning the enumeration of elections with given numbers
of voters and candidates have been pursued. For instance, the number of certain single-peaked
and single-crossing election has been determined in [CF]. Very recently, a closed form for the
number of group-separable elections has been obtained in [K], by using combinatorial tools like
parenthesizations and lattice paths (in particular Schro¨der paths).
In Section 3 we will explicitly state the forbidden configuration characterization of group-
separable elections found in [BH]. More recently, Lackner and Lackner [LL] have revealed the
intimate connection between forbidden configurations in elections and pattern avoidance in
permutations and have exploited it to find interesting combinatorial and probabilistic results
on the above mentioned domain restrictions. In the next section we provide a quick overview of
those achievements of [LL] that are relevant for our paper. Below we give the main definitions
concerning patterns in permutations. Let Sn be the symmetric group over a set of cardinality n,
consisting of all permutations of length n. Given two permutations σ ∈ Sk and τ = τ1τ2 · · · τn ∈
Sn, with k ≤ n, we say that σ is a pattern of τ when there exist 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < · · · < ik ≤ n
such that τi1τi2 · · · τik (as a permutation) is isomorphic to σ (which means that τi1 , τi2 , . . . , τik
are in the same relative order as the elements of σ). When σ is not a pattern of τ , we say that
τ avoids σ. Thus, for instance, 312 is a pattern of τ = 526143 (as shown, for example, by the
three elements 5,1 and 3); however, τ avoids 123.
The present paper builds on [LL] and illustrates a couple of results that strengthen the
validity of the approach initiated in the mentioned paper.
Our first achievement is the definition of a new kind of domain restriction, called enriched
group-separable, which adds more constraints to the group-separable domain. As such, an en-
riched group-separable election is even less likely to appear than a group-separable one, yet we
claim that it has a nontrivial meaning from the point of view of social choice. Moreover, its
links with pattern avoidance in permutations allows us to find nice exact enumerative results
that are much harder to achieve for general group-separable elections.
The second result of our paper is a slight generalization of a result of [LL] concerning
(m, 3)-elections to the case in which all the preferences are different. It turns out that, in
such a situation, configuration containment can be equivalently expressed in terms of strong
containment of pairs of permutations. This notion for permutations is not new, but it has been
little studied, and very few results are known (probably because of its intrinsic difficulty). We
hope that the link with configuration containment we have found can stimulate further work
on this difficult partial order on pairs of permutations.
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2 Preliminaries
The goal of this section is to briefly describe the connections between domain restrictions
and permutation patterns that have been investigated in [LL]. All the stated results come from
such a paper, so we avoid to explicitly recall it for each of them. In this context, the main result
is the following, which shows that the desired link involves elections with 3 voters. From now
on, we use the notation τ ≤ pi to mean that τ is a pattern of pi.
Proposition 2.1 Let τ = τ1τ2 · · · τh ∈ Sh and pi = pi1pi2 · · · pim ∈ Sm, with h ≤ m. Suppose
that (C,P ) is a (m, 3)-election, with C = [m] = {1, 2, . . . m} and P = (V1, V2, V3), such that
V1 : 12 · · ·m, V2 : 12 · · ·m and V3 = pi1pi2 · · · pim (here, as usual in this context, total orders are
represented by listing elements in decreasing order). Moreover, let (S, T ) be a (h, 3)-election,
with S = [h] and T = (T1, T2, T3), such that T1 : 12 · · · h, T2 : 12 · · · h and T3 = τ1τ2 · · · τh. Then
(C,P ) contains the configuration (S, T ) if and only if τ ≤ pi.
As a consequence, the following proposition finds an analogous characterization for elections
with 2 voters.
Proposition 2.2 Let (C,P ) and (S, T ) be elections as in the previous proposition, but with 2
voters. More specifically, in the notations above just remove V2 and T2 and rename V3 and T3
as V2 and T2, respectively. Then (C,P ) contains the configuration (S, T ) if and only if τ ≤ pi
or τ−1 ≤ pi, where τ−1 denotes the group-theoretic inverse of the permutation τ .
The importance of the last proposition lies basically in the fact that it allows to count
restricted elections, at least in the case of 2 voters. Just a piece of notation: for a given set
of permutations Π, the set of all permutations of length n avoiding each permutation of Π is
denoted Sn(Π).
Corollary 2.1 Let (S, T ) be a (h, 2)-election, with T = (T1, T2). Let C = [m] and V1 be a total
order on C. Then the number of total orders V2 on C such that the election (C, {V1, V2}) avoids
(S, T ) is equal to |Sn(τ, τ−1)|, where τ is the permutation which maps T1 into T2.
For more general elections (i.e., with more than 2 voters), the above results can be used to
find nontrivial upper bounds for the number of restricted elections.
Theorem 2.1 Denote with a(n,m,Γ) the number of all (m,n)-elections avoiding the set of
configurations Γ. If Γ contains a (k, 2)-configuration, for k ≥ 2, then, for all n,m ∈ N,
a(n,m,Γ) ≤ m! · c(n−1)mk ,
where ck only depends on k.
The above theorem allows Lackner and Lackner to find interesting upper bounds, for in-
stance, for the number of single-peaked and group-separable elections, which we do not report
here for the sake of brevity.
We close this section with two remarks.
It is implicit in Corollary 2.1 that, given a set of permutations that is closed under inver-
sion, we can translate these permutations into configurations (consisting of two conditions). If
we take “interesting” sets of permutations (closed under inversion), do these sets correspond to
reasonable domain restrictions? Namely, what kind of restrictions does such a set of permuta-
tions impose on a set of total orders that avoid the corresponding configurations? The content
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of the next section proposes an instance of this general problem that we believe to be quite
interesting.
It is often the case that configurations can be conveniently represented using posets. More
precisely, a set of configuration can often be interpreted as the set of all pairs of linear extensions
of suitable posets. Rather than giving a more formal explanation of this statement, we refer to
Section 3 for an explicit description of this kind of enriched group-separable elections.
3 Enriched group-separable elections
Recall that a group-separable election is an election (C,P ) such that, for any subset of
candidates C ′ ⊆ C, there exists a partition of C ′ into two blocks A and B such that, for each
elector i, either i ranks all candidates of A above all candidates of B or vice versa.
There is a characterization of group-separable elections in terms of forbidden configurations,
which is due to Ballester and Haeringer [BH].
Proposition 3.1 An election (C,P ) is group-separable if and only if the following two condi-
tions hold:
• for every x1, x2, x3 ∈ C, there cannot be three distinct preferences V1, V2, V3 in P such that
xi lies between the other two candidates in Vi, for all i = 1, 2, 3 (medium-restricted);
• there do not exist two preferences V1, V2 and four candidates a, b, c, d such that a >V1 b >V1
c >V1 d and b >V2 d >V2 a >V2 c.
Recalling the first remark at the end of the previous section, since the second condition above
is given in terms of a forbidden (4,2)-configuration, which is (abcd, bdac), we can represent it
by means of a set of permutations closed under inversion, which is the set {2413, 3142}. In
fact, the permutation mapping the preference abcd into the preference bdac is 2413, whereas the
permutation mapping the preference bdac into the preference abcd is 3124.
We say that (C,P ) is an enriched group-separable election whenever it is a group-separable
election which, in addition, avoids the (4,2)-configurations (abcd, badc) and (acbd, bdac). There-
fore an enriched group-separable election is a medium-restricted election which further avoids a
certain set of (4,2)-configurations. Such a set can be interpreted as the set of all pairs of linear
extensions of the following two posets:
a
b c
d
b
a d
c
More specifically, the four forbidden configurations are (abcd, badc),(abcd, bdac),(acbd, badc)
and (acbd, bdac). In terms of permutations, the above set of forbidden configurations can be
represented by the set of permutations Γ = {2413, 3142, 2143, 3412}, which is of course closed
under inversion.
The combinatorics of the set Av(Γ) of all permutations which avoid the patterns in Γ is
known and quite nice and interesting. First of all, the permutations of Av(Γ) are precisely those
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permutations which can be drawn on an X [W]. The generating function of such permutations
(with respect to the length) is 1−3x
1−4x+2x2
, and a recurrence relation for the resulting integer
sequence is fn = 4fn−1 − 2fn−2, with initial conditions f0 = 1 and f1 = 1. From this linear
recurrence it is not hard to find a closed formula, which is fn =
1
2(2 +
√
2)n + 12 (2−
√
2)n. This
is a rather interesting sequence from a combinatorial point of view, as it is witnessed by a few
papers studying it (see entry A006012 in [S]).
The elections avoiding the four above configurations (without the medium-restricted con-
dition) can be characterized quite easily. For any subset C ′ ⊂ C of candidates, given an elector
γ, we denote with EC
′
γ the 2-element set consisting of the most preferred and the least preferred
candidates of γ when restricted to C ′. Similarly, we denote with MC
′
γ the complement of E
C′
γ
in C ′, that is MC
′
γ = C
′ \EC′γ . The proof of the following proposition is left to the reader.
Proposition 3.2 An (m,n)-election (C,P ) avoids the four above configurations if and only if
for every C ′ ⊆ C, with |C ′| = 4, and for any two electors γ, δ, we have that EC′γ 6=MC
′
δ .
Our next aim is to provide a recursive characterization of enriched group-separable elections.
Theorem 3.1 Let (C,P ) be an (m,n)-election, with P = (V1, . . . , Vn). W.l.o.g., suppose that
the preference V1 is represented by the identity permutation of length m, that is V1 = 12 · · ·m.
Then (C,P ) is enriched group-separable if and only if there exists k < m such that the multiset
of the preferences in P can be partitioned into two blocks as follows:
• the first block contains all preferences that are isomorphic either to the identity 12 · · ·m
or to its reverse m · · · 21;
• for the second block, we have two distinct possibilities, which are mutually exclusive:
– the preferences in the second block are of the form 12 · · · kpi or of the form σk · · · 21,
where pi and σ are permutations of the set C ′ = {k+1, . . . ,m} and the restriction of
(C,P ) to C ′ is enriched group-separable, or else
– the preferences in the second block are of the form τ(k + 1) · · ·m or of the form
m · · · (k + 1)ρ, where τ and ρ are permutations of the set C ′ = {1, . . . k} and the
restriction of (C,P ) to C ′ is enriched group-separable.
Proof. Suppose first that (C,P ) is an enriched group-separable (m,n)-election. From the
group-separability we have that there exists a partition of the set of candidates C into two blocks
A and B such that each elector i either ranks A above B or vice versa. To simplify notations,
we will denote these two situations by A >i B and A <i B, respectively. Since V1 = 12 · · ·m,
this means that there exists a positive integer k < m such that A = {1, 2, . . . , k} and B =
{k + 1, . . . ,m}. We start by observing that the presence in (C,P ) of the preferences 12 · · ·m
and m · · · 21 does not prevent the election from being enriched group-separable. Therefore we
can temporarily forget all the preferences of this form and consider all the remaining preferences.
Let Vi be a ranking for which A >i B. Since the permutation generated by the pair (V1, Vi)
must avoid 2143, Vi cannot contain both an inversion inside its prefix of length k and an inversion
inside its suffix of length m− k. Therefore, necessarily in Vi either the elements of A are ranked
as in V1 or the elements of B are ranked as in V1. In other words, either Vi = 1 · · · kpi or
Vi = τ(k+1) · · ·m, for suitable permutations pi and τ . In a completely analogous way it can be
shown that, in case A <i B in Vi, due to the presence of the forbidden pattern 3412, Vi cannot
contain both a noninversion inside its prefix of length m− k and a noninversion inside its suffix
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of length m − k. Thus either Vi = m · · · (k + 1)ρ or Vi = σk · · · 1, for suitable permutations ρ
and σ.
Now suppose that Vi, Vj are two preferences such that Vi = 1 · · · kpi and Vj = m · · · (k+1)ρ,
for suitable pi and ρ as above. In particular, pi must contain at least one inversion and ρ must
contain at least one noninversion, otherwise Vi would be the identity and Vj would be the reverse
identity. Therefore the permutation associated with the pair (Vi, Vj) would contain an occurrence
of the pattern 3412, which is forbidden. In a similar way, we cannot have two preferences Vi, Vj
such that Vi = τ(k + 1) · · ·m and Vj = σk · · · 21, otherwise an occurrence of 3412 would show
up as well (again because τ must contain at least one inversion and σ must contain at least one
noninversion).
To conclude the first part of the proof we just observe that, if we restrict our election to any
subset of the candidates, then necessarily the permutations associated with any two preferences
cannot contain any pattern of Γ, otherwise the whole election would contain such a pattern (this
is actually a general property of configuration definable elections, which can be characterized as
those elections which are hereditary, see [LL] for details). This is equivalent to saying that the
restriction of (C,P ) to any subset of candidates is enriched group-separable.
To prove the converse, suppose that the election (C,P ) is of the form specified in the
statement of the theorem. In particular, we have two possible types of elections that are allowed.
1. The multiset of all preferences can be partitioned into the following four subsets:
• preferences isomorphic to the identity 12 · · ·m (type I);
• preferences isomorphic to the reverse identity m · · · 21 (type J);
• preferences of the form 12 · · · kpi (type α);
• preferences of the form σk · · · 21 (type δ);
moreover, the restriction of (C,P ) to the set of candidates {k + 1, . . . m} is enriched
group-separable.
2. The multiset of all preferences can be partitioned into the following four subsets:
• preferences isomorphic to the identity 12 · · ·m (type I);
• preferences isomorphic to the reverse identity m · · · 21 (type J);
• preferences of the form τ(k + 1) · · ·m (type β);
• preferences of the form m · · · (k + 1)ρ (type γ);
moreover, the restriction of (C,P ) to the set of candidates {1, . . . k} is enriched group-
separable.
We now show in some detail that the elections of the first type are enriched group-separable.
The proof for elections of the second type can be done in a completely analogous way.
Since it is clear that, setting A = {1, 2, . . . , k} and B = {k + 1, . . . ,m}, for any preference
Vi in P we have either A <i B or B <i A, the election (C,P ) is group-separable. To conclude
the proof, it will be enough to show that (C,P ) avoids the two configurations represented by
the permutations 2413 and 3412.
Let Vi, Vj be two preferences in P . Given four candidates in the set {k + 1, . . . ,m}, they
cannot constitute a forbidden configuration, since by hypothesis the restriction of the election
to {k+1, . . . ,m} is enriched group-separable. So suppose that x, y, z, t are any four candidates,
with x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. A case by case analysis shows that x, y, z, t cannot constitute a forbidden
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configuration, whatever the types of Vi and Vj are. More specifically, they always form a con-
figuration which must have one of the two elements 1 and 4 either at the beginning or at the
end (and so cannot be neither 2413 nor 3412). For instance, if Vi is of type J and Vj is of type
α, then the smallest among x, y, z, t is the rightmost of them in Vi and the leftmost of them in
Vj (this is due to the fact that there is at least one of such elements which is ≤ k). Therefore in
the pair (Vi, Vj) the four elements {x, y, z, t} constitute a configuration starting with 4. All the
remaining cases can be analyzed in a completely analogous way. 
The previous theorem provides an interesting characterization of enriched group-separable
elections. First of all, an enriched group-separable election is a special group-separable election,
and so there are two blocks of candidates A and B such that each elector ranks either A above
B or vice versa. This means that the set of electors essentially splits into two groups, whose
respective preferences go either to the candidates of A or to the candidates of B. Moreover, there
is an additional requirement for enriched elections, which is the following (possibly exchanging
the roles of A and B): all the electors which prefer A to B rank the candidates of A in exactly
the same way; moreover, all the remaining electors (i.e., those who prefer B to A) rank the
candidates of A precisely in the reverse order.
The special form of enriched group-separable elections allows to find a recurrence relation
for their enumeration, from which a closed formula can be deduced.
Proposition 3.3 Denote with f(m,n) the number of enriched group-separable elections with
m candidates and n electors and with fr(m,n) the number of such elections in which one of the
preferences is fixed. Then the following recurrence relation holds:
fr(m,n) = 2
nfr(m− 1, n)− 2n−1fr(m− 2, n), (1)
with initial conditions fr(0, n) = fr(1, n) = 1. Moreover f(m,n) = m! · fr(m,n).
Proof. The fact that f(m,n) = m! · fr(m,n) is due to the obvious fact that the total
number of enriched group-separable elections is given by the number of enriched group-separable
elections in which one preference is fixed times the number of possible choices for that preference.
Now suppose, w.l.o.g., that the first preference is fixed and equal to 12 · · ·m. Call reduced
such an enriched group-separable election and denote it with (C,P ). There are two distinct
possible types for (C,P ), for each of which the multiset of preferences can be partitioned into
two classes. Specifically, the two types are the following:
• either a preference is of the form 1pi or of the form ρ1, with pi, ρ of length m − 1, and
(C,P ) restricted to the set of candidates {1, 2, . . . m−1} is enriched group-separable (and,
of course, reduced);
• either a preference is of the form σm or of the form mτ , with σ, τ of length m − 1, and
(C,P ) restricted to the set of candidates {2, 3, . . . m} is enriched group-separable (and, of
course, reduced).
The above statement is a consequence of Theorem 3.1. In particular, it is not difficult to
realize that, depending on which of the two above types (C,P ) is, removing either m or 1 results
in an enriched group-separable election.
For both of the above types, in order to determine (C,P ), one has just to decide which
subset of electors is associated with preferences of one of the two forms. Therefore, after having
chosen one of the 2n possible subsets of electors, we simply have to choose a (reduced) enriched
group-separable election on a subset of candidates of cardinality m − 1. This gives a total of
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2nfr(m − 1, n) elections. However, the two above types of elections are not disjoint. Indeed,
elections all of whose preferences have the form 1ψm are of both types, so they are counted
twice. The total number of such elections is clearly 2n−1fr(m−2, n), since it is obvious that the
restriction to the set of candidates {2, 3, . . . ,m−2,m−1} is (reduced) enriched group-separable.
Subtracting such a quantity we obtain precisely formula (1), as desired. 
Equation (1) is a linear recurrence relation in the indeterminatem with constant coefficients.
It can be solved using standard methods, giving the following closed expression for its general
term:
fr(m,n) =
ϕ+ (1− 2n−1)
2ϕ
(
2n−1 + ϕ
)m
+
ϕ− (1− 2n−1)
2ϕ
(
2n−1 − ϕ)m ,
where ϕ =
√
2n−1(2n−1 − 1). Since f(m,n) = m! · fr(m,n), we thus have a closed form for the
number f(m,n) of enriched group-separable elections with m candidates and n electors.
For small values of m and/or n, we are able to write some interesting explicit formulas. The
following corollary is immediate, so the proof is omitted.
Corollary 3.1 1. f(3, n) = 6 · 2n−1(2n − 1).
2. f(4, n) = 24 · 4n−1(2n+1 − 3).
3. f(5, n) = 120 · 4n−1(22n+1 − 2n+2 + 1).
4. f(m, 2) = m!4 ·
(
(2 +
√
2)(2−√2)m + (2−√2)(2 +√2)m).
At least two of the above formulas are worth a comment.
Rather surprisingly, the expression we have found for f(4, n) coincides with the number of
single-peaked elections with the same number of candidates and electors. We do not have any
explanation of this fact, it would be interesting to understand if there is a connection between
the two types of elections. Notice however that the enriched group-separable domain is in general
different from the single-peaked domain. This can be shown, for instance, by counting elections
of the two types when m = 5 and n = 2. In fact, the results from [LL] imply that, in such a
case, there are 8400 single-peaked elections, whereas the above corollary tells us that there are
8160 enriched group-separable elections.
Concerning the formula for f(m, 2), observe that when n = 2 the medium-restricted
configuration cannot appear, so the enumeration of the associated elections coincides with
the enumeration of permutations avoiding the patterns in Γ. Indeed, recurrence (1) becomes
f(m, 2) = 4f(m− 1, 2)− 2f(m− 2, 2), the same recurrence we have mentioned at the beginning
of this section.
4 Configuration containment and strong order on pairs of per-
mutations
Given permutations pi, ρ ∈ Sn and τ, σ ∈ Sh, with h ≤ n, we say that [τ, σ] ≤ [pi, ρ] whenever
there exist h distinct values α1, . . . , αh ≤ n which constitute an occurrence of both τ in pi and
σ in ρ.
For instance, [213, 132] ≤ [614235, 126534], since the elements 2,4 and 5 form an occurrence
of 213 in 614235 and the same elements form an occurrence of 132 in 126534. On the other
hand, [213, 132]  [614235, 152436]. In this case, we say that [614235, 152436] avoids [213, 132].
The above relation is clearly a partial order on pairs of permutations (i.e., on the set S2)
which we call the strong order. This is motivated by the fact that this partial order is of course
8
stronger than the usual componentwise order of the direct product of the pattern poset with
itself.
The strong order on pairs of permutations is not a new notion. It was first defined in
[AADHHM] under the name of involvement order (on pairs of permutations), and some of its
properties has also been investigated. However, there is some evidence that this partial order
is not an easy one, and in particular is much harder than the analogous pattern order on
permutations. For instance, the problem of enumerating classes of pattern-avoiding pairs of
permutations is largely open also for very simple patterns. Just to mention the simplest non
trivial case, it is easy to realize that there is only one pattern of length 2 up to symmetries,
which is (12, 21). However, given a pair of permutations (pi, ρ) of length n, it can be shown
that (pi, ρ) avoids (12, 21) if and only if ρ is below pi in the weak Bruhat order: the problem of
counting such pairs is a well known difficult problem, which is still unsolved.
It turns out that the notion of strong order on pairs of permutations shows up in a natural
way to express containment of configurations in elections.
The next theorem generalizes the result obtained by Lackner and Lackner (recorded here
as Proposition 2.1) to the case of elections with 3 voters.
Theorem 4.1 Let (C,P ) be a (m, 3)-election, with C = {x1, . . . , xm} and P = (V1, V2, V3). Let
(S, T ) be a (h, 3)-configuration, with S = {s1, . . . , sh} and T = (T1, T2, T3). Moreover, suppose
that the preferences are given as follows:
V1 : x1x2 · · · xm V2 : xpi(1)xpi(2) · · · xpi(m) V3 : xρ(1)xρ(2) · · · xρ(m)
T1 : s1s2 · · · sh T2 : sτ(1)sτ(2) · · · sτ(h) T3 : sσ(1)sσ(2) · · · sσ(h),
for certain permutations pi, ρ, τ, σ. Then (C,P ) contains (S, T ) if and only if [pi, ρ] contains one
of the following patterns:
[τ, σ], [σ, τ ], [τ−1 , τ−1 ◦ σ], [τ−1 ◦ σ, τ−1], [σ−1, σ−1 ◦ τ ], [σ−1 ◦ τ, σ−1].
Proof. For any element x ∈ C, we will say that the index of x is i when x = xi. A similar
terminology will be used for the elements of S = {s1, . . . , sh}.
⇐) Suppose that [pi, ρ] contains [τ, σ]. This means that there exist elements α1, α2, . . . , αh ∈ C
whose indices form an occurrence of τ into pi and of σ into ρ. It is not restrictive to suppose
that the αi’s are listed in increasing order of their indices (as elements of C), so that, if
i < j, then αi <V1 αj, for all i, j ≤ h. Therefore, choosing f : {1, 2, 3} → {1, 2, 3} as
the identity function and g : S → C such that g(si) = αi, it is easy to see that (S, T ) is
contained in (C,P ). Indeed, if si <T1 sj, then i < j, and so g(si) = αi <V1 αj = g(sj);
moreover, if sτ(i) <T2 sτ(j), then g(sτ(i)) <V2 g(sτ(j)) because by hypothesis the indices of
the αi’s form an occurrence of τ in pi; for a similar reason we also have that, if sσ(i) <T3
sσ(j), then g(sσ(i)) <V3 g(sσ(j)).
If instead [pi, ρ] contains [σ, τ ], we can use the same argument as above, just interchanging
the roles of σ and τ . More formally, we just have to choose as f the function mapping 1
into 2, 2 into 1 and 3 into 3.
Now suppose that [pi, ρ] contains [τ−1, τ−1◦σ]. Again, this means that there exist elements
α1, α2, . . . , αh ∈ C whose indices form an occurrence of τ−1 into pi and of τ−1 ◦ σ into ρ.
As before, we can assume that, if i < j, then αi <V1 αj , for all i, j ≤ h. Let f : {1, 2, 3} →
{1, 2, 3} be the function mapping 1 into 2, 2 into 1 and 3 into 3; moreover, define g : S → C
by setting g(si) = ατ−1(i). First of all we observe that, if si <T1 sj, then i < j, and so
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g(si) = ατ−1(i) <V2 ατ−1(j) = g(sj), since by hypothesis the indices of the αi’s form an
occurrence of τ−1 in pi. Moreover, if sτ(i) <T2 sτ(j), then g(sτ(i)) = αi <V1 αj = g(sτ(j)),
as a consequence of our assumption on the αi’s. Finally, if sσ(i) <T3 sσ(j), then g(sσ(i)) =
ατ−1(σ(i)) <V3 ατ−1(σ(j)) = g(sσ(j)), since the indices of the αi’s form an occurrence of
τ−1 ◦ σ in ρ. We have thus shown that, in this situation, (C,P ) contains (S, T ).
The analysis of all the remaining cases can be obtained by the previous ones by suitably
interchanging the role of the permutations involved and choosing the appropriate function
f , so it is left to the reader.
⇒) Suppose that (C,P ) contains (S, T ). This means that there are suitable functions f and
g that satisfy the definition of configuration containment given in the Introduction. De-
pending on the particular choice of f and g, there are several cases to analyze. We will
provide details for only two of them, since, as before, all the remaining ones can be easily
derived from those.
Suppose first that f is the identity map on {1, 2, 3} and set g(si) = αi , for all i ≤ h. In
this case, the hypothesis means exactly that the indices of the αi’s form an occurrence of
τ in pi and of σ in ρ, i.e [τ, σ] ≤ [pi, ρ].
Now suppose that f maps 1 into 2, 2 into 1 and 3 into 3, and set g(si) = αi , for all i ≤ h.
We wish to show that [τ−1, τ−1◦σ] ≤ [pi, ρ]. First of all, since f maps 2 into 1, we have that,
in the sequence ατ(1), ατ(2), . . . , ατ(h), elements are listed in increasing order of their indices
(as elements of C). This means that, denoting again by α the permutation isomorphic to
the word defined by the indices of the word α1 · · ·αh (with a slight abuse of notation), the
composition α ◦ τ is (isomorphic to) the identity permutation on the set of the indices of
the xi’s. Equivalently, the word α1 · · ·αh determines a permutation isomorphic to τ−1 on
the set of the indices of the xi’s appearing in the set of the αi’s. Thus, since f maps 1 into
2, we get that, looking at the indices, α1 · · ·αh shows an occurrence of τ−1 in pi, which was
the first thing to prove. Moreover, since f maps 3 into 3, we have that xρ(1)xρ(2) · · · xρ(m)
contains ασ(1)ασ(2) · · ·ασ(h) as a subword (whose letters are not necessarily contiguous,
of course). Since, as we have seen before, the word α1 · · ·αh induces on the indices the
permutation τ−1, looking at the indices of the αi’s inside xρ(1)xρ(2) · · · xρ(m), we observe
that they form an occurrence of τ−1 ◦ σ inside ρ, which is what remained to be proved.
We now state two corollaries of the previous theorem. The first one gives a special case,
which appears to be more manageable. The second one suggests an approach for finding bounds
to the number of elections defined in terms of forbidden configurations, such that at least one
of the configurations is an election with 3 voters.
Corollary 4.1 In the hypothesis of the above proposition, suppose that τ is the identity permu-
tation. Then (C,P ) contains (S, T ) if and only if [pi, ρ] contains one of the following patterns:
[id, σ], [σ, id], [σ−1 , σ−1],
where id denotes an identity permutation (of the appropriate length).
Corollary 4.2 Let V1 be a total order on C (with |C| = m). Let (S, T ) be a (h, 3)-configuration
as in Theorem 4.1. The number of pairs (V2, V3) of total orders on C such that (C,P ) avoids
(S, T ) (with P = (V1, V2, V3)) is equal to |Sm(Π)|, where Π is the set of pairs of permutations
listed in Theorem 4.1.
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The last corollary generalizes Corollary 2.1, which has to do with (h, 2)-configurations, to
the case of (h, 3)-configurations. At least in principle, our result could allow to find some upper
bound for elections avoiding at least one (h, 3)-configuration. Suppose indeed that a(m,n,Γ)
denotes the number of (m,n)-elections (C,P ), with P = (V1, . . . Vn) as usual, avoiding a set of
configurations Γ and let (S, T ) ∈ Γ be a (h, 3)-configuration. In order to determine an upper
bound for a(m,n,Γ), we can find an upper bound for the number of (m,n)-elections avoiding
(S, T ). First of all, we can choose the first ranking V1 of (C,P ) at random, hence we have m!
possibilities. Then we can relax the condition of avoiding Γ by simply requiring for (C,P ) to
avoid the (h, 3)-configuration (S, T ). Even more specifically, we ask that for none of the triples
(V1, Vi, Vj), with 1 < i < j, the election (C, (V1, Vi, Vj)) contains (S, T ). Using Corollary 4.2
and its notations, we know that there are |Sm(Π)| ways to choose each pair (Vi, Vj), where Π is
the set of pairs of permutations listed in Theorem 4.1. Now, since the possible number of pairs
(i, j), with 1 < i < j, is
(
n−1
2
)
, we find the following upper bound:
a(m,n,Γ) ≤ m!|Sm(Π)|(
n−1
2 ). (2)
To illustrate how to apply the above formula, we sketch how it reads in the case of the single-
crossing domain. Recall that preferences are single-crossing if there exists a linear ordering of
the voters such that, for any pair of candidates along this ordering, there is a single spot
where the voters switch from preferring one candidate above the other one. In [BCW] single-
crossing domains are characterized in terms of two forbidden configurations, having three voters
and four voters respectively. Since there is no forbidden configuration with 2 voters, Corollary
2.1 of [LL] is not useful here. On the other hand, since one of the forbidden configurations
has three voters, we can describe an upper bound using formula (2). Without delving into
details (in the forbidden configurations of the characterization of [BCW] some of the candidates
are not necessarily distinct), we can show that single-crossing elections must avoid a certain
configuration with three voters which, in the notations of Corollary 4.2, is associated with the
set of permutations
Π = {[4231, 4132], [4132, 4231], [4231, 1432], [1432, 4231], [2431, 1432], [1432, 2431]}.
Thus we have that an upper bound for the number of single-crossing (m,n)-elections is
given by formula (2), where Π is the set of permutations displayed above.
Unfortunately, as we recalled at the beginning of the present section, the enumerative
combinatorics of pattern avoidance for the strong order on pairs of permutations is still largely
unknown. We hope that our work, showing the connections with elections defined by forbidden
configurations, can stimulate further research on such a topic.
5 Conclusions
Following the footprints of [LL], we have exploited the connections between permutation
patterns and forbidden configurations in restricted elections in order to further show how fruit-
ful such a connection can be. Our first result has been the definition of a new type of domain
restriction, called enriched group-separable, for which we have been able to provide complete enu-
merative results (in an easier way than it has been done for the more general group-separable
restriction). In the same way, it is conceivable that, starting from suitable sets of permuta-
tions closed under taking the inverse, further natural and interesting domain restrictions can
be defined, for which the exact enumeration could be possible. Our second result has been
a generalization of the main result of [LL] concerning the above mentioned connections be-
tween permutation patterns and restricted elections. Our generalization involves the notion of
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strong containment for pairs of permutations, and suggests a possible approach for finding up-
per bounds on the number of restricted elections when the defining forbidden configurations
contains at least one configuration with 3 votes. This improves the approach of [LL], which
works only when there is a forbidden configuration with 2 voters. Unfortunately, our approach
requires a deeper knowledge of the enumerative combinatorics of pattern avoiding pairs of per-
mutations, which is presently unavailable. We thus hope that our achievement will encourage
further research in this direction.
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